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NOTES
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: The Effect of the
Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations on U.S.
Intellectual Property Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
Trade policy is of critical importance to the economic well-being and
the national security of the United States.' On September 20, 1986, at
Punta del Este, Uruguay, the ministers of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 started
the multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round.' Over five
years later, the Uruguay Round still has not come to a conclusion.'
A major hurdle facing the GATT negotiators is how non-tariff bar-
riers (NTB) should be controlled in light of industrialized countries
1 There are three basic trade-related problems involving U.S. intellectual property. First, when
U.S. intellectual property is taken without compensation in foreign markets, U.S. companies lose
royalties, export sales, foreign sales, and the value of their investments. Second, U.S. companies lose
profits to foreign markets when counterfeit products abroad are sold. Third, U.S. companies lose
sales domestically when unauthorized products are imported. Intellectual Property, Domestic Pro-
ductivity and Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the .4dminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1989) (statement of
Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative Ambassador) [hereinafter Carla A. Hills'
Statement].
2 When expressed in capitals, the term "contracting parties" represents the entire entity of
GATT with one vote per member under Article XXV(3). In contrast, the same term expressed in
lower case represents a single individual party. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATION ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TExT 331 (2d ed.
1986). See also GATT, infra note 3, Art. XXV(3).
3 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. Subsequent to 1947, the GATT has been amended several
times. For an updated version of the text of GATT, see GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, 4 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter BISD].
4 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Ministerial Declaration of20 September 1986
(Min. Dec) in BISD 19 (33d Supp. (1987)) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguav
Round].
5 See infra note 115 (discussing the current impasse to the ratification of the GATT).
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which demand strong protection for their own industries from develop-
ing countries which consistently violate trade provisions through trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs).6 Thus, the pro-
tection of intellectual property7 became a new area of concern' for the
United States in GATT negotiations.
Major questions exist on how U.S. intellectual property will be af-
fected by the Uruguay Round. In addition, many potential changes may
occur in the area of U.S. domestic procedures on intellectual property
rights (IPR). As a result of these changes, problems may arise as to the
probable future for U.S. IPR and numerous areas may remain un-
resolved by the GATT. This Note addresses these problems and those
areas left unresolved by the GAIT.
II. THE HISTORY OF IPR IN THE GATT 9
On October 30, 1947, the GATT came into existence as "a legal
framework for a mutual reduction in tariffs." 10 In the beginning, the
GATT centered around three principles: (1) the elimination of NTB;
(2) the participation in periodic negotiations for reducing existing levels
of tariffs; and (3) the according of the most-favored-nation 2 (MFN) sta-
tus to all GATT members so that each member was treated equally by all
other GATT members. 3
By the 1970s, however, the GATT had become ineffective in assist-
6 This trade problem entails an involuntary transfer of wealth from industrialized countries to
developing countries. The transfer of wealth encompasses all forms of intellectual property such as
trade secrets, patents, and trademarks. Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the
Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GAT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 697 (1989) [hereinafter Abbott]. Also, the intangibility of intellectual property
provides for a potential economic gain as "intellectual property wealth can be reproduced and used
without depriving its creater/owner of possession or use and almost without practical limit." Id.
7 The term intellectual property includes patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and
integrated circuits. Oversight of the Trade Act of 1988: Hearing on the Status of the Uruguay Round
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 39-43 (1989) [hereinafter Oversight of
the Trade Act of 1988]. Nations traditionally have put their intellectual property priorities behind
their domestic priorities. This practice has harmed their own international trade interest. Kenneth
W. Dam, The Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L
LAW. 627, 630 (1987).
8 Intellectual property is an area of trade which was traditionally ignored in trade relations
publications. See, eg., JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2 (acknowledging intellectual property di-
rectly or indirectly in only twenty pages of an approximately twelve hundred page book).
9 The GATT has always included intellectual property concerns. Article IX refers to
intellectual property by establishing that marks of origin like trade names should not be used to
injure international trade. GATT, supra note 3, art. IX.
10 ROBERT E. HUDEc, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (1987).
11 Restrictions on the quantity of imports is an example of an NTB.
12 See infra note 60 (discussing the principal of most-favored-nation).
13 HUDEC, supra note 10. In the original negotiations of the GATT, it is worth noting that one
of the GATT objectives vaguely referred to intellectual property. The objective took account of the
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ing countries in maximizing their national economic welfare.14 In 1979,
the GATT departed from its principle of MFN in the Tokyo Round.15
Developed countries were frustrated with the developing countries free-
rider behavior. Further, the developed countries recognized that IPR
were not dealt with properly in the GATT. 6 The GATT discussion fo-
cused on NTB. 17 In 1982, following several years of protectionism, the
United States called for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations
(MTN)."8 This declaration was a major development for IPR under the
GATT.19
Subsequently, the GATT appointed a group of experts to study the
problems of commercial counterfeiting.2' This study led to the TRIPs in
the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round not only moved away from
the traditional tariff negotiations to NTB, the Round moved specifically
into IPR.21 While the current GATT is limited to traditional goods, it
increasing importance in trade patterns of high technology products. Ministerial Declaration on the
Uruguay Round, supra note 4, at 20.
14 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the GATTMulti-
lateral Trade System: Possibilities and Problems of Making GA 7T Rules Effective in Domestic Legal
Systems, in TaE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 33, 35 (Ernst-Uhich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988).
15 See generally AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
16 Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT
A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 245 (1989).
17 Seymour J. Rubin, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
A Quiet Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 221, 224 (1980-81).
18 See LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GAIT ll.A.1 (Kenneth R. Simmonds & Brian
H.W. Hill eds., 1988) (reporting on the Ministerial Declaration of November 1982).
19 Joseph Greenwald, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the GA TT and the Uru-
guay Round: The U.S. Viewpoint in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT at IV.A.5, 1 (Ken-
neth R. Simmonds & Brian H.W. Hill eds., 1988) [hereinafter Greenwald]. Intellectual property
which in the past was vaguely defined now was specifically included in a section of the GATT
entitled Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods.
IAL at 6. See also HUDEC, supra note 10 (discussion on intellectual property in the original GATT
objectives).
20 Greenwald, supra note 19, at IV.A.5.
21 Claude E. Barfield, Services, Intellectual Property and the Major Issues of the Uruguay
Round, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 309 (1989). Mr. Barfield, the coordinator of the Trade
Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., stated: "The... distinguishing
feature of [the Uruguay] Round is the movement into entirely new policy areas. The movement
away from tariff negotiations and into negotiations that concer... so-called new issues ... relating
to intellectual property." Id. By January 28, 1987, the original objective of taking intellectual prop-
erty into account in high technology products became clearly defined in the following negotiation
objectives of TRIPs:
(1) reducing the distortions and impediments to international trade;
(2) taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellec-
tual property rights;
(3) ensuring that the measures and the procedures to enforce intellectual property rights
(IPR) did not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade; and
1992]
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will need to expand to cover IPR in order to be successful. Developed
countries like the United States have lost billions of dollars because their
IPR were not afforded sufficient protection in developing foreign
markets.22
III. UNITED STATES PROTECTION MECHANISMS FOR IPR
Separate from the slow development of IPR in the GATT, the
United States, early on, recognized the importance of IPR to its economy
and export markets.23 U.S. policy makers acknowledged the importance
of protection of IPR in bilateral, multilateral, and international trade
relations.24
A. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193025
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 was the first clear expression
by the United States in protecting IPR.26 The Tariff Act2 7 addressed the
problems of unfair methods of competition and importation of goods into
the United States. Further, the Tariff Act prevented these unfair meth-
(4) making sure that the negotiations were aimed to clarify GAIT provisions and elabo-
rate appropriate new rules and disciplines.
United States Import Restrictions on Agricultural Products - Report of the Working Party adopted on
15 July 1987 (L/6194) in BISD 38, 45 (34th Supp. (1987)). See also Ministerial Declaration of the
Uruguay Round, supra note 4.
22 The International Trade Commission (ITC) has estimated that 736 U.S. companies lost
$23.8 billion in 1986 because of inadequate protection of IPR by foreign countries. Those losses
included trademark, counterfeiting, and misappropriation and infringement of patents, copyrights,
trade secrets, and other types of intellectual property. Also, the developing countries such as Brazil,
China, India, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea were found to be the main culprits for not prose-
cuting IPR violations. Abbott, supra note 6, at 700-01. See generally infra note 30 (discussing the
structure of the ITC).
23 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 225 (1986) [hereinafter OFFICE TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT]. See also R.A.A. Hurst, Effective Worldwide Protection of IPR the Role of
GA7T, 4 COMPUTER L. & PRAc. 78 (1988) (noting that the protection of IPR in developed coun-
tries is almost non-existent, and in all other countries totally absent).
24 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 225-226.
25 Tarriff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)) [hereinafter Tariff Act].
26 Willard Alonzo Stanback, International Intellectual Property Protection: An Integrated Solu-
tion to the Inadequate Protection Problem, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 517, 528 (1989).
27 The pertinent part of the Tariff Act reads as follows:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles (other than
articles provided for in subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d)) into the United States, in the sale of
such articles by the owner, importer, or consignee, or the threat of effect of which is - (i) to
destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States; (ii) to prevent the estab-
lishment of such an industry; or (iii) to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the
United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982), as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988) (Supp. 1 1991).
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ods and acts from having the effect or tendency of destroying or injuring
any U.S. industry.2" Moreover, the Act stopped the restraining and the
monopolizing of trade and commerce in the United States.29
Section 337 authorizes the International Trade Commission (IT) 30
to issue an exclusion order31 which excludes an imported good found in
violation of the section. In addition, the ITC is commissioned to issue a
cease-and-desist order32 which simply requires an individual or an entity
violating Section 337 to cease-and-desist their violations. However, the
President can veto either order based on his judgment that the order is
contrary to the national interest.
3s
By 1987, Congress came to the important conclusion that Section
337 was not effective in deterring imports which infringed on U.S. IPR.34
Consequently, Section 337 was amended to increase the protection of
U.S. IPR by adding procedures to expedite relief.35 Specifically, the Om-
28 Id. See also Hyundai Electronics Industries v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d
1204, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Intel Corporation brought a Section 337 complaint before the United
States Tariff Commission. Intel complained that Hyundai among others were manufacturing an
erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM) circuit and that the importing or selling of the
EPROMs violates Intel's patents. To make a Section 337 case, Intel "alleged that the effect or
tendency of the unfair acts was to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States
that was efficiently and economically operated."); New England Butt Co. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (a complainant must show both an unfair act and
a resulting detrimental effect or tendency to prove a violation of the Section 337); but cf Textron
Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (where an American
manufacturer failed to show how the unfair acts caused or tended to cause it substantial injury).
29 19 U.S.C § 1337(7)(O(1)-(2) (1982) (amended 1988).
30 The ITC is an independent administrative agency of the U.S. government which consists of
six commissioners. The commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate for staggered nine year terms. Under the Tariff Act, the ITC investigates unfair meth-
ods of competition and unfair acts of importation. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b) (1982) (amended 1988)
and 19 U.S.C. § 1332(a)-(b) (1982).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1982) (amended 1988). See also Viscofan v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 787 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (allowing an exclusion order on a foreign manufacturer
for the length of time that it would have taken the manufacturer to create the misappropriated
manufacturing process).
32 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(1)-(2) (1982) (amended 1988).
33 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982) (amended 1988). See generally Mitsuo Matsushita, Coordi-
nating International Trade with Competitive Policies, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 345-430 (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988) (discussing Section 337 procedures).
34 H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 155 (1987).
35 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified as amended at various sections of 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Omnibus Trade Act]. The Omni-
bus Trade Act contained the U.S. objectives of trade negotiations in the GATT. These negotiations
included GATT procedures for efficient dispute settlement, enhancing the status of GATT, bettering
and extending the operation of GATE, increasing transparency in the GATE, imposing greater dis-
cipline on unfair trade practices, and most importantly, obtaining the enforcement of GATT rules
against unfair trade enterprises and against unfair direct investment and intellectual property prac-
tices. Id. § 1342 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988)).
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nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 amended section 337 of
the 1930 Tariff Act by adding three provisions. First, complainants who
allege that imports infringe upon a valid U.S. IPR no longer need to
prove the threat of injury or suffering of any kind.36 Under the amended
Act, the only injury requirement is the infringement of a valid patent or
process patent, copyright, trademark or semiconductor design.3 7  Sec-
ond, complainants only need to show that they represent a domestic in-
dustry3" in the United States. 39 Lastly, the Omnibus Trade Act
accelerated relief proceedings by shortening the time of completion under
section 337 of the Tariff Act.' Thus, these amendments to section 33741
gave substantial benefits to the business community. As a result, the U.S.
business community gave IPR high priority.4'
36 Id. § 1342(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988)).
37 Id. § 1342(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) & (C) (1988)). Compare with supra
note 28 and accompanying text (discussing an example of a Section 337 action under the former
requirement that a domestic industry must be operating efficiently and economically).
38 The Omnibus Trade Act has significantly broadened the domestic industry requirement. A
petitioner no longer has to show that it was an efficiently and economically operated domestic indus-
try. It must only prove that its industry is in existence or is in the process of being established.
Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1342(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(A)-(C(1988)).
At a minimum, the petitioner must show: "(1) a significant investment in plant and equipment"; (2)
"significant employment of labor or capital"; or (3) "substantial investment in its [intellectual prop-
erty rights] exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or licensing to qualify as
an industry and have a remedy." Id. For example, to be considered as a domestic industry for an
original Section 337 action other than one involving IPR, the industry must be physically located in
the geographic United States. In addition, the domestic industry definition covers only articles
within the IPR relied upon in the industry. Schaper Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 717
F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Schaper the intellectual property right was a patent right.
Thus Schaper's domestic industry covered only articles relying upon that patent right. In contrast,
under the amended Section 337 for an IPR violation, the domestic industry was defined as an indus-
try with substantial investment in the exploitation of the intellectual property to constitute sufficient
intellectual property activity. United States Section 337 of the Taiff Act of 1930- Report by the
Panel adopted on 7 November 1989 (L/6439) in BISD 345, 401 (36th Supp. (1990)) [hereinafter
Report by the Panel adopted on 7 November 1989]. This latter definition covers a larger number of
products within the domestic industry.
39 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1342(a)(1)(A)(i) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(a)(3)(A)-(C) (1988)).
40 Id. § 1342(a)(3)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(2) (1988)).
41 The European Community (EC) has protection procedures similar to Section 337. Commer-
cial Protection Regulation 2641/84 is the EC's equivalent to Section 337. See Modak-Truran, Sec-
tion 337 and GATT in the Akzo Controversy: A Pre- and Post-Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act Analysis, 22 INTELL. PROP. L. REV Ann. 189, 199-200 (1990) (discussing Commercial Protec-
tion Regulation 2641/84).
42 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 793 (June 6, 1990).
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B. Section 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act 4 3
Section 301 is the principal mechanism by which the United States
addresses unfair trading practices of other countries. The United States
Trade Representative (USTR) conducts Section 301 actions as part of an
executive program. The USTR proceeds with a Section 301 action by
lodging a complaint before the GATT forum.45
Under Section 301, by April 30 of each year,' the USTR must iden-
tify to Congress the countries which meet the GATT requirements on
government procurement 47 or meet three criteria for discrimination in
areas not covered by the GATT.48 These criteria are: (1) a pattern or
practice of discrimination against U.S. goods and services; (2) an identifi-
able harm to U.S. business; and (3) a significant amount of purchases by
the United States of products or services from the violating country.49
By using the above criteria, Carla A. Hills, the Ambassador of the
U.S. Trade Representatives Office, produced a list of "priority" coun-
tries5" and trade barriers51 under "Special" 301 of the Omnibus Trade
43 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1301(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 et seq. (Supp.
1988)).
44 Section 301 refers broadly to the trade remedies provide by the Omnibus Trade Act.
45 GATT forums vary by the type of claim brought by a contracting party. JACKSON & DA-
vEY, supra note 2, at 337-45. See also Paul Freedenberg, The 1988 Omnibus Trade Bilk Issues and
Perspectives, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 365, 366 (1989); THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 535 (Erst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mein-
hard Hilf eds., 1988) (explaining the GAIT dispute settlement provisions and procedures); infra
note 62 (discussing the role of a GATT panel in a dispute resolution proceeding).
46 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1304 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(1)-(2) (1988)).
47 Government procurement is "where governments have adopted policies and practices that
afford protection to domestic products and exclude foreign suppliers." "Super 301" Trade Liberali-
zation Priorities, FACT SHEET (Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.),
May 25, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
48 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1302(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(2)(A)-(B)
(1988)).
49 USTR Issues" Reports on Procurement and Intellectual Property Protection, Bus. AM., May
21, 1990, at 15.
50 The identification of priority countries are based upon "the potential to increase U.S. exports
if these [unfair] practices are eliminated; .. .the precedent effect of seeking and obtaining their
elimination; ... the likelihood that 302 investigations would advance U.S. efforts to eliminated these
practices; and ... the compatibility with United States objectives in the Uruguay Round." FACT
SHEET, supra note 47, at 2-3. These considerations do not represent all of the factors to be taken
into consideration by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), as they just represent the
USTR's major considerations in identifying a priority country. Id.
51 The USTR addresses five categories of trade barriers. These are (1) quantitative import
restrictions; (2) exclusionary government procurement; (3) technical barriers to trade; (4) trade-
related investment measures; (5) barriers to trade in services. FACT SHEET, supra note 47, at 2.
These categories are the most authoritative categories, as the USTR may look to other factors in
determining a country's priority status. Id.
1992]
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Act.52 Countries identified as "priority" countries are ones which have
failed to provide adequate and effective protection for IPR. However, if
a priority country has entered into good faith negotiations or significant
bilateral or multilateral negotiations, then the Act does not allow a coun-
try to be labeled as a priority country.53 Subsequently, under the so
called "Super 301" of the Omnibus Trade Act, the USTR initiates inves-
tigations against those countries labelled as priority countries. 54
Private parties may also request the USTR to take Section 301 ac-
tions against governments which fail to protect IPR by filing a petition
under Section 302 of the Omnibus Trade Act." Under section 302, a
private party must be an interested party56 who has been directly affected
by the complained about act, policy, or practice, or by a foreign govern-
ment failing to grant U.S. trade rights under an agreement.57 The peti-
tion5" must be submitted to the USTR Section 301 Committee Office. 9
52 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1303(b) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (1988)). See
also Carla A. Hills' Statement, supra note 1, at 48.
53 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1303(b) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(l)-(B)(C)
(1988)). See also Intellectual Property, Domestic Productivity and Trade" Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 80 (1989) (prepared statement of Ralph Oman, Registrar of
Copyrights and Assistant Librarian for Copyright Services) [hereinafter Ralph Oman's statement].
54 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 35, § 1302(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b) (1988)). See
also Carla A. Hills' Statement, supra note 1, at 48. The first step of "Super 301" is to prepare a
National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report. The NTE report lists eight categories of foreign trade
barriers: import policies; standards, testing, labeling and certification; government procurement; ex-
port subsidies; lack of intellectual property protection; service barriers; investment barriers; and bar-
riers that affect more than one category. Ralph Oman's Statement, supra note 53, at 74.
55 Omnibus Trade Act § 1301(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988). See also 55 Fed. Reg.
20,593, 20,595 (1990) (discussing the procedures for filing petitions for actions under Section 301 of
the Omnibus Trade Act by private parties).
56 An interested party may be a person, firm, or an association which is directly affected by a
foreign government's failure to grant rights of the United States under a trade agreement. 55 Fed.
Reg. 20,593, 20,595 (1990). For example, on November 15, 1990, three associations filed a petition
under § 302(a) against Thailand. The petition alleged that Thailand's government denied fair and
equitable opportunities to market U.S. products, did not establish enterprises to distribute U.S. prod-
ucts, and further, that Thailand failed in protecting U.S. IPR. These allegations flowed from Thai-
land's failure to enforce its copyright laws on piracy. The petitioners showed that the above
complained of practices had cost U.S. industries between seventy million and one hundred million
dollars per year. Consequently, the USTR "initiated an investigation of Thailand's acts, polices and
practices relating to the enforcement of copyrights." 56 Fed. Reg. 292 (1991).
57 55 Fed. Reg. 20,593, 20,595 (1990).
58 A petition must include the following: (1) the identity ofpetitioner and his injured economic
interest; (2) the description of the U.S. rights being violated or denied under the trade agreement; (3)
copies of the laws or the regulations which are the subject of the petition; (4) the identity of the
foreign country with which the United States has the trade agreement; (5) the identity of the subject
matter which was injured; (6) a demonstration of discrimination, burden or restriction of U.S. com-
merce; (7) a showing of the degree of burden, restriction, volume of trade, and a description of
methodology; (8) a statement of any other forms of relief sought by the petitioner. Id. at 20,595 - 96
(1990).
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IV. CONFLICTS WITH THE U.S. APPROACH TO IPR AND THE
FORMAT OF THE GATT
On June 17, 1987, the European Community (EC) lodged a com-
plaint that U.S. patent enforcement procedures under Section 337 of the
Tariff Act was incompatible with Article III of the GATT.6' Generally,
the EC's complaint stated that the U.S. patent holders can choose to
bring disputes before the ITC or federal district courts, while no
equivalent choice is available to a foreign patent holder.61 The GATT
panel62 ruled on November 23, 1988, that Section 337 did not provide for
national treatment found in Article III:4.63 Thus, Section 337 was in
59 Id. at 20,595.
60 Article 111:4 requires that governments must treat imported products at least as well as like
domestic products in terms of taxation and regulation. This requirement is commonly referred to as
"national treatment" The GATT violation by the United States consisted of abridging this national
treatment requirement. Article 111:4 states:
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affect-
ing their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.
GATT, 62 Stat. 3679, 3681, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, at 4, 62 U.N.T.S. 80, 82 (Sept. 14, 1948) (amending
GAT, supra note 3). See also Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987) (ITC's exclusion order affirmed). In addition, to
clarify its complaint, the EC indicated three issues that it was not contesting:
- the status of Section 337 procedures as they were applied in non-patent based
investigations;
- the consistency with the General Agreement of substantive United States patent law;
and
- the right of contracting parties to enforce at the border national patent law against
infringing imports.
Report by the Panel adopted on 7November 1989, supra note 38, at 355. Currently, the protection of
patent rights is an exception to the national treatment obligation. GAIT, supra note 3, art. XX(d).
However, this exception only applies to the different treatment of imports and domestic products in
enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, patent law treatment of both imports and domestic prod-
ucts must be consistent with the GAIT. Id.
61 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 793 (June 6, 1990). The EC was concerned with the
differences between the patent-based Section 337 actions and litigation under U.S. domestic law
through the federal courts. See Report by the Panel adopted on 7 November 1989, supra note 38, at
350-53 (listing the differences between Section 337 and the federal court proceedings).
62 By invoking Art. XXIII:2 of the GAIT, a contracting party may request a panel to assist
the disputing parties. The panel usually consists of three to five members who are not citizens of the
disputing parties. The Director-General of the GAT proposes the composition of the panel, while
the contracting parties have the power of approving the Director-General's proposal. See Under-
standing Regarding Notification Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance in BISD 210
(26th Supp. (1980)), reprinted in Jackson & Davey, supra note 2, at 337-44.
63 Report by the Panel adopted on 7 November 1989, supra note 38, at 345. Specifically, the
GAT panel found the United States violated the GAT national treatment obligation in four ways.
First, domestic complainants of an imported good were afforded access to both the courts and the
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conflict with the United States' obligations under the GATT. 6
On November 7, 1989, the United States finally accepted the panel
ruling.65 Even though the United States withdrew its opposition, it was
troubled by the implications of the panel decision because the United
States offers a higher level of protection of IPR than those of most other
GATT members. 66  However, if the United States is to ratify any IPR
agreement in the Uruguay Round, Section 337 must conform to the
GATT.67
Another area of potential conflict with the GATT is Section 301 of
the Omnibus Trade Act. According to the USTR, every country poten-
tially falls under the designation of a "priority" country based upon the
Uruguay Round proposal.68 The Uruguay Round proposal seeks en-
forcement of adequate and effective protection of IPR while virtually all
countries deny this higher level of protection which is more consistent
ITC, while foreign complaints of the United States were primarily limited to the federal court sys-
tem. Id. at 389. For example,
[I]f a Japanese company with a U.S. patent wishes to utilize Section 337 to stop the flow of
infringing imports from another Far Eastern country, it could do so only if it had a U.S.
subsidiary and that subsidiary could meet the [standing requirement of Section 337]. On
the other hand, if the same patent holder chose to import the merchandise from Japan and
had no U.S. subsidiary, it probably would have no standing under Section 337.
Jeffrey S. Neeley & Hideto Ishida, Section 337 and National Treatment Under GAT.l A Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 276, 290 (1990) [hereinafter Neeley & Ishida]. Second,
foreign producers were accorded less favorable treatment by fixed time limits of twelve or eighteen
months for final disposition in the ITC with no comparable time limits applicable to the U.S. produ-
cers. The domestic petitioner of an imported good has more time to prepare a case before the ITC,
while the foreign respondent is limited in time to respond. In contrast, a foreign petitioner of a
domestic good who is limited to the federal court system affords the domestic respondent unlimited
time to prepare a defense. Report by the Panel adopted on 7 November 1989, supra note 38, at 352.
Third, the Panel found a foreign respondent's inability to bring counterclaims in the ITC also vio-
lated the GAIT national treatment obligation. As a result, a domestic complainant who had no
exposure to an adverse finding in an ITC proceeding would be less likely or willing to settle a case.
Id. at 389-90. Fourth, the Panel found the principal remedy under Section 337, the automatic in
rem exclusion orders, gave domestic complaints in the ITC an unfair advantage of reduced enforce-
ment costs. In contrast, in federal courts, the foreign complaints faced higher costs with remedies
which operated in personam. Id. See also Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
645 F.2d 976, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that personal jurisdiction is not required for Section 337
orders).
64 Leaked GATT Panel Ruling Against U.S. Patent Infringement Laws Surprises USTR Offi-
cials, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1645 (Dec. 21, 1988).
65 Report by the Panel adopted on 7 November, supra note 38, at 345.
66 Id.
67 USTR Ambassador Carla A. Hills strongly indicated that the GATT deal must be in
"America's best interest." If the agreement does not reform trade for all countries, Ambassador Hill
will walk away from the negotiating table. Market Moving, Reuters, Feb. 7, 1990, available in
LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Wires File.
68 Ralph Oman's statement, supra note 53, at 75 (referring to the Office of the United States
Trade Representatives, Fact Sheet, "Special 301" on Intellectual Property (Wash., D.C. 1989) at 2).
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with the Omnibus Trade Act.69
Foreign criticism focuses on the unilateral nature of Section 301.
Foreign countries complain that the United States is unilaterally attack-
ing foreign practices without taking notice of GATT procedures or rec-
ognizing the GATT as a multilateral forum.70 Foreign countries assert
that the United States and its trading partners have agreed on the GATT
to govern international trade and to resolve disputes, and therefore any
unilateral action by the United States violates or is contrary to its inter-
national obligations under the GAIT.7
Section 301's unilateral trade actions are the "antithesis of [Uru-
guay] Round's goal of increased trade liberalization." 72 However, it ap-
pears that with an action-oriented Congress and business community,
only a highly successful Uruguay Round will lead to any reform of the
Section 301 law.73
V. PROPOSALS FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND
The importance of protecting IPR in the United States is evidenced
by the strong responses given by both the governmental and private sec-
tors regarding TRIPs.74 Carla Hills, while summing up the importance
of TRIPs, stated: "Americans who engage in international trade are very
concerned about the harm to [U.S.] trading interests that results from the
69 Id. The Omnibus Trade Act affects the GATT in four major ways. First, a domestic indus-
try no longer has to prove an injury for granting relief as under the old Section 337. Second, the
industry no longer needed to demonstrate that it was efficiently and economically operated. Third, a
U.S. patent holder can proceed before the ITC under amended Section 337 or seek the appropriate
relief under federal district court. Fourth, the amended Section 337 definition of an industry has
been significantly broadened to allow more firms to bring a Section 337 action. Under the Omnibus
Trade Act, an industry must show a substantial investment in IPR to qualify as a domestic industry.
BISD 400-401, (36th Supp. (1989)). See generally Andrew S. Newman, The Amendments to Section
337: Increased Protection for Intellectual Property Rights, 20 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 571 (1989) (for
further discussion on the amendments to Section 337).
70 Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, I1 MICH. J. INT'L L.
394, 398 (1990).
71 Id. at 398. However, Warren Maruyama, the Deputy Associate Director for International
Economic Policy, noted that the foreign criticism avoids the issue that there are no GATT proce-
dures specifically addressing the IPR issue. Id.
72 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 766 (May 30, 1990). On May 23, 1990, Arthur Dunkel,
GATT Director General, voiced his concerns that if the Uruguay Round is unsuccessful, then many
countries will pattern themselves after the U.S. Section 301 practice. Id.
73 Id. See also EC Sees Return to Multilateral Solutions, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at
616 (May 2, 1990) (reporting that Tran Van Thinh, the EC's chief negotiator, believes that Section
301's unfair trade practices can be only eliminated by creating international disciplines for IPR).
74 President Bush clearly stated the "Uruguay Round of the GAIT continues to be the center-
piece of our trade strategy. While the lack of effective multilateral rules and enforcement mecha-
nisms has forced us to resort to Section 301, we look forward to the day when such actions will be
unnecessary." Statement by the President, Statement on United States Action Against Foreign
Trade Barriers, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRs. Doc. 777 (May 26, 1989).
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lack of adequate and effective protection of [IPR] in many foreign mar-
kets.""5 U.S. negotiating objectives for the Uruguay Round are to bring
the GATT's multilateral objectives in IPR closer to U.S. objectives in the
Omnibus Trade Act.76 Specifically, these objectives are: "[1] adequate
substantive standards, [2] effective enforcement of those standards, both
internally and at the border, [3] an effective dispute settlement proce-
dure, and [4] the application of basic principles such as national treat-
ment and transparency."77
These objectives demonstrate the USTR's contention that interna-
tional economic growth and competitiveness will be strengthened if all
countries maintain strong domestic intellectual property protection.78
Further, the USTR believes that international enforcement will lead to a
reduction of distortions in international productions and trade results.79
Finally, the USTR asserts that the United States will continue to have a
"very substantial stake" in strong protection of IPR.Y° Therefore, the
United States cannot afford to agree to anything less than what it actu-
ally possesses nationally in IPR protection."
Protection of IPR is also a matter of the highest priority for the
Department of Commerce.82 The Commerce Department firmly believes
75 Carla A. Hills' Statement, supra note 1, at 30.
76 Id. at 35.
77 Id. at 35-36. There are five topics being negotiated for the substantive standards mentioned
in objective one: copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and semiconductor chip layout de-
signs. Id. at 36 (for an overview of each of these five topics see id. at 37-43). The term transparency,
used in objective four, refers to the United States' will to have open and equitable resolutions where
both parties do not hold back any information that could hurt an expressed resolution which may be
reached by the parties. See generally Omnibus Trade Act, § 1342, 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(3) (amended
1988).
78 Carla A. Hills' statement, supra note 1, at 32.
79 Id. at 32-33.
80 Id. at 33.
81 The U.S. proposal on IPR concentrated on internally protecting domestic industry through
the concept of due process. Under due process, the U.S. industries have the appropriate system to
take action and enforce their rights. Id. at 44. In addition, the United States seeks to allow foreign
governments the ability to initiate their own action when required. Id at 45-46. Further, the
United States seeks to enforce IPR at the borders, so that IPR owners can initiate their action on
alleged import violations before the imports enter the country. Id. at 44-46.
82 The Commerce Department primarily deals with federal technology management issues.
Under the Commerce Department, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issues patents and regis-
ters trademarks. Also under the Commerce Department, the International Trade Administration
(ITA) has responsibilities relating to foreign protection of U.S. IPR. Intellectual Property, Domestic
Productivity and Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989) (state-
ment of Wendell L. Willkie, II, General Counsel, Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Wendell L.
Willkie, II's statement]. Both the ITA and PTO participate in bilateral consultations within the
special Section 301 procedures of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Id. at 6-7. In addition, the PTO
routinely provides foreign countries with technical training on intellectual property laws. Id. at 7.
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that strong protection and enforcement of IPR will encourage investment
in new products and services that are essential to U.S. industries.8 3 Also,
the Commerce Department states that rigorous IPR laws will lead to
reasonable returns for U.S. companies and will create incentives for re-
search and development.8 4
In addition to the U.S. Government's position on IPR, lobbyist
groups like the Intellectual Property Alliance (IPA)85 and the Intellec-
tual Property Committee (IPC)86 have been working hard to push Con-
gress to adopt a GATT agreement which strongly protects IPR.87 The
IPA advanced that if the GATT limited current U.S. ability to pursue
bilateral and regional TRIPs objectives, the United States should not
enter into the GAIT.8 8 The IPA proposed that the United States fully
participate in the GAIT by pressuring the other contracting parties to
provide provisions which sufficiently protect IPR and establish mecha-
nisms to enforce those provisions.8 9 Also, the IPA recommended that
the United States continue in its bilateral initiatives, as the improvements
in intellectual property protection have resulted in a reduction of trading
losses from $1.3 billion in 1984 to $645 million in 1988 in copyright
piracy alone.' However, the IPA maintains the position that "the job is
not finished." 91 The IPA continues to work for even greater IPR
protection.
Reflecting a similar position to the IPA, the IPC also recommended
there be no reduction of the current levels of IPR protection afforded by
U.S. law.92 The IPC suggested that any GATT agreement signed by the
83 Id. at 6.
84 Id.
85 The Intellectual Property Alliance (IPA) is a U.S. domestic alliance of seven trade associa-
tions which represent a copyright community. Over 1600 companies are members of the IPA. Over-
sight of the Trade Act of 1988, supra note 7, at 31 (statement of Jason Berman, President of the
Recording Industry Association of America) [hereinafter Jason Berman's Statement]. The IPA was
founded in 1984. It supports traditional and new forms of intellectual property, encourages sanc-
tions against lesser developed countries that have inadequate IPR protection, and harsh penalties for
such violations. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 5199 (Deborah M. Burek ed., 25th ed. 1990).
86 The Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) was formed in 1986 to organize domestic and
international support for improving the protection of IPL Its membership includes corporations
like General Electric, DuPont, IBM, Bristol-Myers and others. Oversight of the Trade Act of 1988,
supra note 7, at 34 (statement of C.L. Clemente, Vice President and General Counsel of Pfizer Inc.)
[hereinafter C.L. Clemente's Statement).
87 See generally, Oversight of the Trade Act of 1988, supra note 7 (where both the IPA and IPC
made proposals to the Senate Committee on Finance).
88 Jason Berman's Statement, supra note 85, at 34.
89 Id. at 33.
90 Id. at 32.
91 Id.
92 C.L. Clemente's Statement, supra note 86, at 36.
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United States must contain effective deterrents to infringements of IPR
and must adopt rules for the protection of IPR.93 IPC suggests that in-
centives like preferential treatment, transition rules, and technical assist-
ance should be included in the GATT agreement when coupled with
consultations, market access, and assistance outside the GAT format.9 4
IPC also claims that the elimination of trade distortion can be achieved
by requiring contracting parties to create IPR laws which can be used by
private right holders. 95 Finally, IPC maintains that when contracting
parties fail to make adequate IPR laws the use of multilateral consulta-
tion and dispute settlement procedures will lead to a reduction of trade
distortion.96
Another advocate of strong IPR is the private industry sector. Pri-
vate companies97 are unwilling to disclose technology to developing
countries because of the lack of protection for U.S. IPR.98 In addition,
these companies find there is no effective sanction in developing countries
for a breach of confidence, especially where a company is dealing with
government-controlled or quasi-governmental institutions.99
In developing countries, private companies maintain the position
that it is very difficult for them to obtain a return on secret patent know-
how.1" These developing countries place compulsory licensing condi-




96 Id. See also; infra note 142 (discussing how Section 30 I's bilateral approach opens trade on
a multilateral level).
97 The author takes the position that, for purposes here, British Petroleum's position on IPR
sufficiently represents the standard position of the entire private industry sector and will be used
accordingly. British Petroleum would like to improve international investment by encouraging tech-
nology transfers. Letter from RIF. Fawcett, Manager, Patents & Agreements Division, to L.W.
Evans, P & L, BPA (May 4, 1990) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law) (the letter references an unpublished, attached paper setting out BP's priorities in the final
stage of the GAIT Uruguay Round) [hereinafter letter from Fawcett].
98 British Petroleum, GAIT: Uruguay Round of Negotiations 2 (November 1988) (position




101 Compulsory licensing provisions provide that patent owners who do not work their patent
for a certain period of time in a country may be compelled to grant a license to interested third
parties. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1202 (Aug. 1, 1990). For example, in Brazil, a patent
will be forfeited officially or at the request of a third party when the invention has not begun to work
within four years or if the invention has stopped working for two or more consecutive years. Id.
British Petroleum takes the position that the GAIT should not include compulsory licensing of
technology to developing countries by reducing the returns to the developed countries' companies.
Compulsory licensing would discourage technology transfer to developing countries. See letter from
Fawcett, supra note 97.
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ments.' °2 These types of practices severely constrain the ability of
companies to receive a reasonable return.
103
Private companies encounter great difficulty in securing the enforce-
ment of existing laws or rules that protect IPR in developing coun-
tries.' °4 For example, in most cases, the authorities in developing
countries do not pursue cases of counterfeiting. 1 5 If a counterfeiting
case does reach the developing country's court system, the courts demon-
strate ambivalence towards the foreign offenders. 6 Furthermore, when
developing countries are deficient or void of a system for protection of
IPR, foreign companies are reluctant to transact business within those
countries' borders."0 7 Thus, U.S. companies demand clear rules and
clear guidelines, along with a strong indication that those rules will be
enforced in developing countries. 10
Lastly, private companies are not only concerned with losses from
business, they are also concerned with the emergence of strict product
liability laws.' °9 They argue that counterfeit products do not meet the
high standards of the original products and as a result, claimants will
mistakenly file liability claims against the original manufacturer. 01
Thus, the original manufacturer incurs unnecessary and costly legal ex-
penses defending wrongful claims.
VI. LIviNG WIrH THE 1991 GATT
"To be, or not to be: that is the question."'11
1





107 For example, China's domestic law is entirely lacking in copyright protection. Thus, the
only copyright protection available to a private party is the terms of its contract within China.
However, enforcement of those contract terms is difficult and generally the terms do not cover copy-
right violators who are not a party to the contract. Consequently, the lack of copyright law prevents
effective protection for proprietary technology in technical manuals, limits the distribution of artistic
works, and greatly hampers transfer of technologies involving pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Pit-
man B. Potter, Prospects for Improved Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, CHINA Bus. REV.
27 (1989).
108 BP Position Paper, supra note 98.
109 See Letter from Fawcett, supra note 97. (discussing the GAT Uruguay Round).
110 Id.
111 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet Act III, Sc. 1, in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE THE COM-
PLETE WORKS 1047 (Peter Alexander ed., 1964). A successful GATT would have resulted in
greater U.S. growth in trade. U.S. GNP would have risen by $130 billion or 2.5% by the end of
1990 as a result of efficient U.S. exporters who would have had better access to foreign markets.
Further, the United States would have gained jobs and in turn the new jobs would have driven the
economy. Since the GAT failed in 1990, the costs to the United States were a slower growth in
U.S. productivity and losses totaling an estimated $100 billion in the GNP. Uruguay Round Results
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Because of a stalemate in agriculture negotiations, the mid-Decem-
ber 1990 deadline for completion of the Uruguay Round brought a sus-
pension of the negotiations rather than the long-hoped-for agreement.112
Initially, the GATT negotiations were on Congress' "fast-track"'1 13 dead-
line of June 1, 1991.114 Congress, however, extended the fast-track for an
additional two years.115
During the GATT negotiations, the United States and other devel-
oped countries held the position that the GATT must include substantive
standards for "IPR protection, enforcement mechanisms, and GATT
dispute resolution procedures."' 16 On the other hand, developing coun-
tries, led by Brazil, contended that they should not have to maintain the
monopoly positions of the developed countries' companies by enforcing
the developed countries' IPR.117 These countries also argued that the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 118 as well as other
Could Alter US. GNP by Billions, New Data Show, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1578
(October 17, 1990).
112 The impasse to the Uruguay Round was due to negotiations on agricultural trade with the
EC. Specifically, the EC's proposal on market access and reducing exports was inadequate for major
agriculture countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia. The EC proposed a thirty per-
cent reduction in domestic price supports over ten years, and no specific reductions in import barr-
ers and export subsidies. The major agriculture countries were proposing a seventy-five percent cut
in domestic price supports and a ninety percent cut in export subsidies. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 45 at 1722 (Nov. 14, 1990). See id. at 1747-61 (a reprint of the text of the EC agricultural
proposal at the Uruguay Round). The author notes that the GATT negotiations formally resumed
on February 26, 1991. William Duilforce, Optimism at Relaunch of Trade Talks, FIN. TimEs LIM-
ITED (London), Feb. 27, 1991, § I, at 7.
113 Under a fast-track procedure, Congress must either fully accept or reject, without altera-
tion, any GATT agreement entered into by the President. See generally JAcKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 2, at 151-155 (1986).
114 This meant the administration could negotiate until June 1, 1991. 7 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 46, at 1774 (Nov. 21, 1990). Many individuals pressured the administration to require
that the President's renewal deadline, March 1, 1991, [the deadline for President Bush to exercise his
option to ask Congress to extend the June 1 deadline] be the final deadline for the GATT talks.
Joseph E. Connor, the president of the International Chamber of Commerce, stated the "substantive
agreements [of the GATT] in principle in the most crucial negotiating areas must be in hand by
March 1, 1991." President of International Chamber of Commerce Says Stalled GAIT Talks
Threaten the Future of Global Trade, PR Newswire Ass'n, Jan. 30, 1991 available LEXIS, NEXIS
Library, PRNews File. Senator Max Baucus of Montana stated that March 1, 1991 should be
treated as a final deadline for the Uruguay Round. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1774 (Nov.
21, 1990).
115 Senate & House Vote to Extend Fast Track for North American FTA, Uruguay Round
Talks, 8 Int'l Trade. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 802 (May 29, 1991).
116 Richard 0. Cunningham, The Restatement as Prologue to Turmoil in the Law: A Commen-
tary on the Restatement of US. International Trade Law, 24 INT'L LAW. 315, 325 (1990).
117 Id.
118 Established in 1967, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a United
Nations Agency which administers intellectual property conventions. The WIPO's responsibilities
range from promotion of creative intellectual activity to facilitation of transferring of technology to
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non-GATT groups, are the appropriate forums for IPR discussions. 119
Another major barrier to a final agreement is found in the intellec-
tual property area of negotiations. The United States is very disillu-
sioned and upset with Japan's alignment with less-developed
countries.1 20 Japan proposed a "first-to-file" patent system which is in
direct conflict with the United States' "first-to-invent" approach. 121
Thus, regardless of the agriculture impasse, a final GATT agreement ap-
pears highly unlikely to receive Congressional approval without a sub-
stantial resolution in the intellectual property area."
Even with the present turmoil in GATT negotiations, U.S. indus-
tries continue to file Section 301 unfair trade practices against foreign
countries. As of late, Thailand has been a prime target of these com-
plaints. On November 15, 1990, a coalition including the IPA, filed such
an action against Thailand for failing to enforce U.S. domestic copyright
laws against pirates of audio and videocassettes.123 On January 30, 1991,
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) filed a Section
301 action against Thailand for its failure to protect pharmaceutical pat-
ents. 124 It clearly appears the U.S. industry is quite willing to work with
developing countries. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
119 Cunningham, supra note 116, at 326. The critical interest of these developing countries is a
transfer of technology which will help their domestic industries. Id. For example, India argues
intellectual property laws will drive up domestic prices. This rise in prices will deprive developing
and poor countries access to patented, trademarked and copyrighted products. 7 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 34, at 1306 (Aug. 22, 1990).
120 Bruce Stokes, Japan's Role in Faltering Trade Talks, 23 NAT'L J., Jan. 12, 1991 at 80.
121 Id. at 81. See also 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 708-15 (May 16, 1990) (for a
duplication of the U.S. draft agreement presentation on trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights (TRIPs) at the GATT negotiations). The established practice in the United States is that an
applicant who first invented the claimed subject matter, even if a later inventor was the first to file for
the patent, is awarded the patent. Gregory Wrenn, What Should Be Our Priority - Protection For the
First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 872, 872 (1990). In the
rest of the world, with exception of the Philippines, the applicant who first filed for the patent would
be awarded the patent. Id.
122 See H.R. Con. Res. 354, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990). Note that the United States and the
EC are basically in concurrence to what should be covered in the GATT on IPR. John Richards,
Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 902, 922 (1990).
123 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1768 (Nov. 21, 1990). See also supra note 56 (explain-
ing the details of the coalition's petition against Thailand).
124 Pharmaceutical Industry Files Petition Against Thailand Over Patent Protection, 8' Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 200 (Feb. 6, 1991). Almost, concurrently, the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA) identified twenty-two countries for some level of Section 301 investiga-
tions. The IIPA asked that Thailand, India, The People's Republic of China, Brazil, Indonesia,
Greece, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates be labelled as priority
watch countries. Also, the IIPA recommended to the USTR that Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Ger-
many, Italy, Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia be placed on a
lower-priority watch list. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 274 (Feb. 20, 1991).
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Clearly, the United States will not alter its position on a need for
expeditious relief for its industries as seen by the recent bilateral proceed-
ings before the ITC.1 27  Consequently, any reform at the GATT level
must mirror the ITC proceedings or, in the alternative, the United States
must stop discriminating against foreign intellectual property holders
who do not have domestic industries.1 2  Excluding the IPR issue from
the GATT and negotiating the IPR issue in a totally separate forum
would be a viable solution. However, if the GATT is to include IPR, the
United States needs to address the problem that trade secrets1 29 have
been excluded from the current GAIT negotiations.1 30
Having the GATT proceedings mirror the ITC proceedings would
be unrealistic. The ITC proceedings are set up to protect industrialized
countries like the United States, so developing countries are not likely to
125 USTR does not view Section 301 as a move towards unilateralism. The only unilateral
action in its opinion is the identification of U.S. negotiating priorities. This identification in turn
leads to bilateral or multilateral consultations and even in some cases to a formal dispute settlement.
All of which leads to trade liberalization. FACr SHEET, supra note 47.
126 The president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association (PMA), Gerald Mos-
singhoff, stated "the current stalemate of the overall GATT, and specifically, intellectual property
negotiation has made it imperative that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry work with the existing
bilateral laws to ensure patent protection." Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 200 (Feb. 6, 1991).
The executive vice president and chief financial officer of Honeywell, Christopher J. Steffen, stated
"the task before us now is to assure that U.S. trade laws maintain the existing remedies for dealing
with intellectual property incorporated into imported products. Congress will be considering further
amendment to our trade laws, including Section 337 that permits [the ITC] to ban the import of
infringing products." Honeywell Disappointed in GATT Outcome, PR Newswire Ass'n, Dec. 10,
1990, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, PR Newswire File.
127 See supra note 72, at 766 (Carla Hills "pledged to enforce [Section] 301 strongly" if the
Uruguay Round talks failed and a scaling back of Section 301 would only occur with an overwhelm-
ing successful Round). See also supra note 67 (Hills indicating that any GATT agreement must be
in "America's best interest").
128 See supra note 38 (for definition of a domestic industry).
129 A federal circuit court applying Illinois state law stated a trade secret is "a secret plan or
process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those employees to whom it is
necessary to confide it." Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
vacated, 470 U.S. 1047 (1985), reinstated on remand, 767 F.2d 901 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting cita-
tions omitted). See also infra note 176 (referring to the Uniform Trade Secret Act's definition of a
trade secret).
130 The basic problem is that trade secrets are not covered by any international treaty. The
United States wants to establish the "norms [of international trade secrets] almost from scratch."
An Idea-merchant's Lexicon, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 1988, at 74. On the other hand, the United
States clearly includes trade secrets in the area of intellectual property. Oversight of Trade Act of
1988, supra note 7, at 42-43.
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agree to such a narrow type of proceeding."' Further, if the United
States imposes economic sanctions, developing countries would become
less willing to adopt a cooperative approach toward improving protection
of IPR within their own borders. 13 2 On the other hand, if the GATT
proceedings are too broad, the same industrialized countries and their
constituents will balk at any agreement.'33 Thus, U.S. domestic law
should be used as a model for any GATT forum IPR proceedings.134
Still, there are significant limitations to building an effective global
trade policy similar to Section 301.135 First, a global copy of Section 301
will not lead to broad-based multilateral changes because Section 301
usually relies on only two countries dealing with a single unfair trade
practice. 136 Second, if one country has no leverage with another country,
a Section 301-based system will be ineffective. 137 Third, a global-based
system will lead to trade wars where all involved will be worse off.1
38
Finally, such a system may cause friction between countries which could
lead to retaliation in countries on other international objectives. 139
U.S. initiatives of Section 301, however, have demonstrated the
value of bilateral negotiations on particular practices to complement
multilateral negotiations. 1" For example, a foreign country must have
leverage for effective Section 301 negotiations. Additionally, in Section
301 negotiations, retaliation will be a significant factor.14 ' With these
131 Countries like India and Brazil do not want any GAIT provisions on IPR. John Richards,
Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 906, 922 (1990).
See Maruyama, supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing developing countries' criticism of
Section 301). See also Cunningham supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining developing
countries position in the GATT); infra note 186 (discussing developing countries dependance on
their pirate industries).
132 Potter, supra note 107, at 27.
133 See Jason Berman's Statement, supra note 85, at 31-34; See also H.R. Con. Res. 354, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990). See generally Hurst, Effective Worldwide Protection of IPR: The Role of
GATT7, 4 COMPUTER L. & PRAc. 78 (1988).
134 For example, a potential GATT provision can incorporate ITC procedures such as not
allowing counterclaims, while providing for a more difficult threshold standard for standing than the
ITC.
135 The USTR recognizes that Section 301 is not a substitute for the GATT, but an important
market-opening tool. The GATT is the preferred long-term solution for enforcement procedures of
IPR. The GATT will facilitate a better approach to resolving a number of interrelated issues. FAcT
SHEET, supra note 47, at 8.
136 Maruyama, supra note 70, at 401.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. These objectives would include issues revolving around finance, military defense, and
the environment. Id.
140 See infra note 145. See also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
141 Maruyama, supra note 70, at 400. This is also evidenced by the recent actions against
countries like Thailand. See supra note 56. Cf. supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing
the investigation of designated priority watch countries for possible patent violations).
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bilateral negotiation practices, Section 301 has significantly opened trade
for the United States.142
The problem, however, is that the United States is in violation of the
national treatment article of GATT.1 43 An easy, but unrealistic solution
for the United States would be to comply with the GATT panel's find-
ings.144 Such a course would mean the United States would no longer be
violating Article III by protecting its own industries. However, such a
solution seems untenable because of the hostility against any weakening
of IPR in the United States. 145
In order to comply with national treatment of Article III, a foreign
respondent to a Section 337 action must be allowed to counterclaim
against a U.S. petitioner.146 Once again, the present hostility against
weakening the Section 337 proceeding would make this unrealistic. In an
ITC proceeding, the effect of counterclaims would give the foreign re-
spondent more remedies than the U.S. petitioner who is limited to cease-
and-desist and exclusion orders. 47 This practice would simply negate
the effectiveness of Section 337, as the U.S. petitioner would be under the
threat of money damages by the foreign respondent. Therefore, U.S. pe-
titioners would be less likely to fie Section 337 claims. 141
In addition to counterclaims, the United States would have to
lengthen the Section 337 time period for the eventual disposition of a
case. 49 The ITC proceeding should be lengthened to two-and-one-half
years to three years. This length of time would be roughly equivalent to
the average length of time for a disposition of a patent case in federal
142 Interestingly, advocators of the U.S. Section 301 system argue that the U.S. bilateral system
has led to free and open trade which benefits both the United States and developing countries. Alan
F. Homer & Judith Hippler Bello, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 14: The 1988 Trade Bilk
Saviour or Scourge of the International Trading System?, 23 Ir'L LAW. 523, 527-28 (1989). These
advocates point to examples of U.S. Section 301 action that opened the market for third parties.
- A settlement the United States reached with Japan on beef and citrus imports bene-
fited the United States as well as Australia and New Zealand.
- The Section 301 investigation of Korean intellectual property practices benefited pat-
ent and copyright holders worldwide.
- The United States action against Japan on semiconductors opened the Japanese 'chip'
market for all foreign semiconductor producers.
Id. at 528. In addition, Korea has agreed to liberalize its foreign investment and similarly Taiwan
has agreed to promote an open market. FAcT SHEET, supra note 47, at 4.
143 See supra note 63.
144 Id
145 See supra note 72. See also supra note 135.
146 See supra note 63.
147 Neeley & Ishida, supra note 63, at 295.
148 Id.
149 The ITC has to make its final determination in twelve or eighteen months depending on the
complicity of the case. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988). See also supra note 63.
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district court.' ° Thus, both the foreign and domestic respondents would
be afforded similar time periods for forming a defense.'51
Lastly, resort to in rem remedy proceedings in Section 337 cases
must be made temporary. This change would lessen the monetary ad-
vantage the U.S. petitioners in ITC proceedings have over foreign peti-
tioners who are limited to federal court proceedings. 5 2 Also, domestic
petitioner's access to both federal court and ITC must be restricted. In
the alternative, the United States should allow all intellectual property
right holders to bring a claim under Section 337. Both of these proposi-
tions should modify Section 337 to overcome any arguments that the
United States is not in compliance with the GATT's national treatment
obligation. 153
Another possible solution is to remove the IPR issue from the
GATT and place the issue exclusively in the WIPO's Patent Harmoniza-
tion.' 54 However, in order to place IPR in the Patent Harmonization,
the United States will have to change its first-to-invent system to a first-
to-file system. 55 Also, the United States must give "prior art"'56 effect
to an application subsequently published as an application or granted as
a patent as of its earliest filing or priority date. 57  Even with these sub-
150 From July 1, 1986, to June 30, 1987, the average time for a disposition of a patent case in
federal district court was thirty-one months. Report by the Panel adopted on 7 November 1989,
supra note 37, at 365.
151 See supra note 63.
152 Id
153 See The New York Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Association, Comments on Pos-
sible Amendments to Procedures for Enforcement of Patent Rights Responsive to GATT Criticism of
TariffAct § 337, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'y 700, 713-18 (1990) (proposing a legislative
response to the GAT panel report).
154 A meeting of a committee of experts on November 13, 1989, started the process towards
patent law harmonization. In June 1991, a diplomatic conference was to be held on a draft form of
patent law harmonization from which a formal treaty will likely result. William T. Fryer III, Patent
Law Harmonization Treaty Decision Is Not Far Off- What Course Should the US. Take? 4 Review
of the Current Situation and Alternatives Available, 30 IDEA: J. L. & TECH 309, 310 (1990). See
also id. at 311-13 (explaining the WIPO treaty process). Emery Simon, Director of Intellectual
Property at the USTRP, stated some IPR have been achieved through the WIPO as a result of the
positive TRIPs negotiations in the GATr. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 330-31 (Feb. 27,
1991).
155 Williams S. Thompson, President's Page, in AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N BULL. 538, 539
(Sept. 1990) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law) [hereinafter
AIPLA BULL.] (discussing harmonization of patent laws). These modifications in U.S. law will
address the conflict with Japan and its allies in the GAT. See supra note 123 and accompanying
text (discussing Japan's position of first-to-file).
156 "[IThe meaning of 'prior art' in legal theory... is knowledge that is available, including
what would be obvious from it, at a given time, to a person of ordinary skill in an art." Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See generally Kirk M.
Hartung, "Prior Art't" The Undefined Key to Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 32 DRAKE L. Rav.
703 (1983).
157 AIPLA BULL., supra note 155, at 539. However, if the United States is to make such
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stantial concessions, the U.S. patent bar is urging U.S. negotiators to seek
patent harmonization in the WIPO.1 15
Placing the IPR issue in the WIPO forum would be looked upon
favorably by developing countries like India and Brazil. These develop-
ing countries have actively sought to place intellectual property in the
WIPO forum. 59 However, these countries seek to include topics like
compulsory licensing which would diminish the level of IPR protection
sought by the developed countries.1 "° Also, the current WIPO conven-
tions lack effective enforcement mechanisms. 161 These issues will be op-
posed by the developed countries, but this opposition is not an
insurmountable problem considering the concessions which would have
to be made by the United States. 162
Primarily, the developing countries seek to include compulsory li-
censing in the WIPO to avoid research and development expenses or to
radical changes in its patent law, the following provisions which benefit U.S. applicants must be
accepted by the foreign countries:
1. an effective grace period of one year applicable to public disclosures by the inventor,
third parties who obtained information directly or indirectly from the inventor, or succes-
sors in title to the inventor, which grace period is not subject to dilution by prior user
rights;
2. applications may be filed in any language subject to submission of a translation within
two months, which translation may be corrected at any time during pendency or subse-
quently as a granted patent provided that error may be demonstrated with reference to the
original nonofficial language filing or a priority filing in another country;
3. a country should have the option of giving prior art effect to an application which is
subsequently published to negate the inventive step as well as novelty, but it should be
mandatory for all countries to exclude such applications as prior art against later filed
applications of the same inventor or applicant;
4. countries providing search and examination of patent applications should be required
to do so with reasonable dispatch to obtain clarification of rights in a reasonable time
period with every effort made to produce a search at the time of first publication, to begin
examination no later than three years after filing and exert its best efforts to complete
examination no later than five years from filing date;
5. opposition or revocation procedures should not be available before patent grant so as
not to delay the granting of a patent; and
6. an effective scope of protection will be provided by extending protection to reasonable
equivalents as determined at the time of infringement and not limiting claims by detailed
features of the described embodiments not contained in the claims.
Id. (These proposals are made by the American Intellectual Property Law Association).
158 Donald M. Spero, Patent Protection or Piracy, A CEO Views Japan, HARv. Bus. REv. 58,
61 (Sept. / Oct. 1990), available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, HBR File.
159 Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property:
Promises Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 292 (1989) [hereinafter Kastenmeier
& Beier].
160 Id. at 292. See also 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1202 (Aug. 1, 1990) (discussing
the effect of compulsory licensing).
161 Kasteinmeier & Beier, supra note 159, at 295.
162 See supra notes 158 & 160.
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avoid supplementing their research capabilities. These countries avoid
these costs by acquiring their technology through licenses. 163 Further,
these developing countries continually seek to copy patented or trade-
marked products which have good reputations in order to create employ-
ment in their own markets. 164 Typically, developing countries see
licensing as an effective channel for technology transfer which contrib-
utes to growth in their industrial capacity. 165
In WIPO negotiations, developed countries must continue to argue
that intellectual property laws will increase the availability of new prod-
ucts. When a country passes patent laws, "the mentality shifts from
copying to innovating." 166 Developing countries' must realize that with-
out patent laws, their domestic industries lack incentive to research and
develop new products.167 If the developed countries' firms find them-
selves unable to gain reasonable returns on their investments because of
ineffective intellectual property laws, developing countries will have
nothing to copy and their consumers will be deprived of new goods and
services.
Regardless of the forum in which the IPR issue is finally resolved,
the variations of trade secret protection are very extreme on the interna-
tional level1 68 and not addressed by the current GATT proposals. 69 In
protecting trade secrets, a firm generally does not need to show objective
novelty, 70 obviousness, 17 or required formalities except those necessary
163 John H. Barton, Robert B. Dellenbach & Paul Kuruk, Toward a Theory of Technology
Licensing, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195, 210 (1988) (citing D. FRAME, INTERNATONAL BUsINESS AND
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY 110 (1983)).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 214. This growth will be especially evident in countries which "(1) the technology
supplied is basic process know-how not otherwise generally available; (2) the licensing agreement
permits assimilation of the know-how by the user; and (3) the recipient enterprise takes steps to
bring about assimilation by its own personnel and institutions." Id.
166 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1306 (Aug. 22, 1990).
167 Id.
168 Thomas G. Field Jr., Pharmaceuticals and Intellectual Property: Meeting Needs Throughout
the World, 31 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 3, 8-9 (1990). See also Thomas G. Field, Jr., Brief Survey of
Intellectual Property, 31 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 85, 109-13 (1990) (discussing trade secrets in the
context of U.S. laws). The United States is looking for protection of trade secrets on the scale of
Uniform Trade Secret Act which makes theft of trade secrets punishable. Sam Starobin, Fighting
Offthe Pirates, 12 NEw ENG. Bus. 18, 19 (Nov. 1990). See ag. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426.2-3426.4,
3426.7 & 3426.10 (West Supp. 1991).
169 See supra text accompanying note 130.
170 By comparison, in an application for a patent, a prospective patent owner has to make
assurances that the protected subject matter is objectively novel. Field, Pharmaceuticals & Intellec-
tual Property, supra note 168, at 6. See also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1984).
171 By comparison, in a patent claim, a claim can not cover subject matter "obvious" to indi-
viduals who are equally skilled as the petitioner. Field, Pharmaceuticals & Intellectual Property,
supra note 168, at 6. See also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52
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to preserve secrecy.172 For protection of trade secrets, firms must pri-
marily rely upon state law. At the international level, firms can rely on
the tenuous protections of confidential relationships 173 and industrial es-
pionage practices. 7 4 However, this level of protection is grossly inade-
quate on an international level. 175
Generally, the United States must seek a broad definition for trade
secrets. 17 6 The United States must avoid agreeing to an international
definition of trade secret similar to the Japanese definition which states a
trade secret cannot be publicly known.1 77 Under such a definition, a cor-
poration must assume any disclosure to any number of individuals could
make the trade secret publicly known.17 1 This type of disclosure is too
low a standard for effective trade secret protection.
On the other hand, a broader U.S. definition would give greater
trade secret protection because of its requirement that the maintenance
of trade secrecy must be "reasonable under the circumstance." 1 79 This
requirement would allow a judge to determine if the owner's efforts to
maintain the trade secrets were reasonable under the circumstances and
thereby maintain the owner's trade secrecy protection.18 0
The U.S. definition would be more equitable than the Japanese defi-
nition since a trade secret owner would not have to make his corporation
(1966) (non-obviousness is satisfied when the result of the invention is not what those skilled in the
"prior art" would expect).
172 Field, Pharmaceuticals & Intellectual Property, supra note 168, at 9.
173 See supra note 107 (discussing remedy under contract law in China as an example of under-
developed countries).
174 Field, Pharmaceuticals & Intellectual Property, supra note 168, at 9. To show a trade se-
cret infringement a petitioner must show improper access and copying. Id. at 11.
175 For example, these types of protection do not limit firms from duplicating a product or
process by inspecting goods obtained from the marketplace which is commonly referred to as "re-
verse engineering." Id. at 8. Also, an individual may independently develop information of a com-
petitor's trade secret. Independent development is not a misappropriation of a trade secret. William
E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes Misappropriation of a Trade Secret, 30 IDEA:
J. L. & TECH. 287, 293 (1990).
176 For example, the Uniform Trade Secret Act defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, tech-
nique, or process, that (I) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means, by
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West Supp. 1990) [hereinafter Uniform Trade Secret Act].
177 For a review of the new Japanese trade secrets law, see David W. Hill & James W. Ed-
mondson, Preparing For Japan's New Trade Secret's Law, 12 E. ASiAN EXEC. REP. 9, 13 (Dec.
1990).
178 Id. at 14.
179 Uniform Trade Secret Act, supra note 176.
180 Hill & Edmondson, supra note 177, at 16.
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an impenetrable security fortress.1 81 Thus the United States must insist
that trade secrets be included in the definition of intellectual property
and that a reasonableness requirement be included in the definition of
trade secret.
Finally, the political reality of the GATT negotiations indicates that
the United States should rely on its own domestic IPR laws.'8 2 The de-
veloping countries are quite vulnerable to Section 301 pressures as evi-
denced by the recent actions against Thailand.'8 3 The vulnerability of
smaller developing countries comes from their dependence on the United
States for trade.8 4 An example of this vulnerability involves the situa-
tion surrounding pharmaceutical products. Where developed countries
consider the pharmaceutical issue as an issue of financial policy due to
lost sales resulting from the lack of patent protection on human drugs,
the developing countries are more concerned with health policies than
patent protection when it comes to pharmaceutical products. 1 5 Conse-
quently, any GATT provisions similar to the U.S. bilateral process will
be adversely viewed by these developing countries.'8 6
A possible solution to this political problem can be a grandfather
clause in the GATT provision on IPR.187 With such a clause, a develop-
ing country would be completely protected from any unilateral action
against it by a GATT member. In return, at some specified future date,
the developing country would agree to future transparent negotiations on
amendments to the GATT IPR provisions and to improve their domestic
IPR enforcement to meet these future amended GATT provisions. After
this specified date, the developing countries would be open to unilateral
action by GATT members for any violation of the GATT IPR provi-
sions. Consequently, under this grandfather clause system, developing
Is Id. at 17.
182 Braga, supra note 16, at 261-64 (discussing the political economy of IPR protection).
183 See supra note 56. Cf supra note 124, at 274 (request that Thailand be placed on U.S.
Watch List).
184 For example, Section 301 is ineffective against larger developing countries which are less
dependent on trade with the United States and because of political or military concerns. Kas-
tenneier & Beier, supra note 159, at 302-03.
185 Id. at 295.
186 In addition, many of these developing countries depend on their pirate industries for in-
come. Therefore, a loss of this income would be an economic incentive not to ratify any IPR provi-
sions in the GATT. See generally 32 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 794, at 472-74
(Aug. 28, 1986) (discussing the economic effect of pirate industries in developing countries and its
adverse effects on U.S. industry).
187 The GATTs Protocol invalidates a member's legislation which is inconsistent with Part II
of the GATT only if that legislation was in place prior to October 30, 1947, and has not been
amended in a manner that has increased its inconsistency with the GATT. Protocol of Provisional
Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5,6 at A2051
(1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, reprinted in IV BISD 77 (1969). See also JACKSON &
DAVEY, supra note 2, at 299-300 (interpreting the language of the protocol).
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countries would more likely be willing to ratify a GATT agreement simi-
lar to the U.S. bilateral process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of intellectual property in the GATT is a bold and
necessary move by the United States. An internationally agreed upon
framework of minimum standards for TRIPs is necessary to keep trade
in the multilateral arena. If the United States hopes for any type of
agreement, it must balance each of its proposals to the GATT. However,
this appears unlikely in light of the protective attitude by both Congress,
the Administration, and U.S. intellectual property community. Thus,
the future for IPR appears to be a protective process where each country
will try to protect its own industries. The result of this protectionism
will seriously curtail the benefits received by all countries when they en-
gage in world trade.
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